

Program with Abstracts

June 21st

8.30-9.00 Registration

9.00-10.20 **Nikolaj Pedersen**. If Truth is One, then so is Logic: on Moderate Pluralism about Truth and Logic

According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. Truth is One because there is a single truth property—truth-as-such—that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Truth is Many because this truth property may be grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. In recent work Michael Lynch has suggested that a commitment to moderate truth pluralism supports logical pluralism, understood as the thesis that there are several equally legitimate notions of validity. The path from truth to logical pluralism is meant to go through Generalized Tarski's Thesis (in the terminology of Beall and Restall (2006)): an argument is valid_X if and only if, in every case_X in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true. Since different properties ground truth in different domains and go with different types of case, different domains go with different kinds of validity. In this paper I critically examine Lynch's argument. I suggest that Lynch fails to distinguish between rules of reasoning for truth-as-such and rules of reasoning for properties that ground truth-as-such. Taking on board this distinction I argue that there is no path from moderate alethic pluralism to logical pluralism via Generalized Tarski's Thesis. I then go on to investigate whether there is any sense in which moderate truth pluralists can be pluralists about logic.

10.30-11.50 **Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi**. Deflationary Pluralism

In this paper we explore the possibility of an alethic pluralistic view that includes, among the plurality of ways of being true, a deflationary truth property for the domain of basic taste. In his *Truth and Objectivity*, Crispin Wright has advanced an argument – which he calls *the Inflationary Argument* – purported to show that the Equivalence Schema plus minimal assumptions on the logical behaviour of negation and the conditional entail that truth is a normative notion whose normative guidance contrasts with that of epistemic justification. The intended conclusion is that in virtue of its normative character, truth's nature cannot be as metaphysically innocent as deflationists take it to be. To make the case for the possibility of a deflationary property alongside other, more substantive, truth properties, we need to show that the Inflationary Argument can be locally blocked. We examine two versions of the argument and we show that judgments about basic taste provide counterexamples to both versions. The tentative conclusion is that truth in the domain of basic taste is purely deflationary and normatively indistinguishable from justification (but yet not identical to justification). Lastly, we discuss which pluralistic framework best accommodates to the introduction of a deflationary property of truth.

11.50-13.20 lunch

13.20-14.40 **Jeremy Wyatt**. The Puzzle of Truth-Aptness and the Meaning of 'True'

Abstract: In this talk, I'll offer some motivations for a novel, non-indexical contextualist semantics for the word 'true.' I start by looking at a recent semantics for 'true' proposed by Max Kölbel,

according to which 'true' is ambiguous. I offer some concerns for Kölbel's semantics that are generated by a case much like one that he himself considers. I then argue in turn that a particular non-indexical contextualist semantics for 'true' can avoid these concerns and that the intuitions arising from the Kölbel-style case serve to motivate this semantics.

14.50-16.10 **Luca Zanetti**. Epistemic Justification: Monism, Pluralism, Anti-Justificationism

The current debate on the nature of justification assumes monism, i.e. the view that there is only one kind of justification. Arguably, the debate has reached an impasse that calls for a diagnosis. In this paper I shall pursue a diagnostic approach and propose a way to overcome the impasse that consists in the rejection of the monist assumption. I will present two challenges to monism: first, there is no monistic view that adequately captures all our putative intuitions about justification; second, monism does not have the resources to account for the nature of the sceptical challenge. If monism is rejected, we are left with two alternatives: pluralism, i.e., the view that there is more than one kind of justification, and anti-justificationism, i.e., the view that there is nothing that counts as epistemic justification. The rest of the paper is devoted to an articulation of these views and an assessment of their respective merits. I will tentatively conclude in favour of a qualified version of anti-justificationism.

16.20-17.40 **Matteo Plebani**. Ontological Pluralism and Number Talk

Ontological pluralism is the doctrine that there are different modes of existence. Van Inwagen (1998, p. 236) argues against ontological pluralism along these lines: since existence claims ('the Fs exist') are closely connected to number claims ('the number of Fs is larger than zero'), the univocity of number words should convince us that existence is univocal too. Turner (2010) suggests a reply to Van Inwagen's argument: an ambiguity in the expression 'the number of the Fs is larger than zero' does not imply that numerals like 'zero' are ambiguous; rather, pluralists should say that the expression 'the number of' is ambiguous. I argue that the reply suggested by Turner is in tension with an abstractionist account of number talk that in recent times many have found attractive.

17.50-19.10 **Doug Edwards**. Truth as an Extrinsic Property

In this paper I explore the kind of property that truth is. In particular, I investigate the idea that truth is an extrinsic, as opposed to an intrinsic, property. This is a more complex issue than it may first appear, as it is hard to pin down the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic properties; and there are also difficulties brought by different accounts of propositions, and by different kinds of truths, with contingent and necessary truths being two examples. I aim to develop a general framework for understanding intrinsic and extrinsic properties, locate truth within it, and then explore the ways in which pluralist theories of truth can be incorporated.

20.00 Conference dinner

June 22nd

10.00-11.20 **Andy Yu**. Logic for Alethic Pluralists

Although the twin challenges for alethic pluralists to maintain standard accounts of the logical operators and of logical consequence were first posed in Williamson (1994); Tappolet (1997, 2000),

there have been few attempts to answer them in a sufficiently systematic and precise way. Cotnoir (2013)'s attempt is a notable exception, but focuses only on answering the second challenge, and founders when taken to be an attempt to answer the first challenge. In this paper, I present a logic on behalf of pluralists that answers both challenges in a systematic and precise way.

11.30-12.50 **Michele Sandrini.** The Question of Pluralism and the Search for New Axioms in Set theory

The forcing technique was discovered by Paul Cohen in the early sixties. Since then forcing has appeared to be a very powerful tool to provide independence results in Set theory. Actually, because of the foundational role played by Set theory with regard to the rest of classical mathematics, and because of the possibility to mimic from the standard axiomatic basis of Set theory, ZFC, the proof of the existence of almost any mathematical object, forcing has been applied to different areas of mathematics revealing to us the undecidability of many different important questions connected with different branches of mathematics.

Schematically, it seems possible to observe two fundamentally different kinds of philosophical reactions to the emergence of the forcing-independence phenomenon in Set theory. On the one side, there is the so-called pluralist stance toward the question of undecidability in Set theory. Generally, the pluralist thinks that the independence phenomenon in Set theory sanctions the end of the story concerning the possibility to find the correct answer to the independent questions. The pluralist stance toward the notion of mathematical truth, actually, covers many different positions, which may be philosophically different one from another. It suffices to say here that, as a common feature, the pluralists seem to agree on the idea of a substantial dispersion of the notion of mathematical truth for all the mathematical questions shown to be independent by the forcing technique. A corollary of such a position is that there are many different set theories, and that none of them can claim a central position in the foundations of mathematics. On the other side, there is the non pluralist stance toward the notion of mathematical truth. Not all of the reactions, in fact, have been pessimistic concerning the possibility of reconstructing from the ruins of forcing a (as much as possible) unified Set theory. Goedel's reaction and the so-called program for large cardinal axioms stands out as an important historical and philosophical case. Goedel's non-pluralist attitude toward the question of undecidability in Set theory determined by forcing techniques has had a remarkable influence during the subsequent decades, and, as a matter of fact, in the contemporary debate in Set theory and foundations of mathematics, the search and the classification of new axioms, which are intended to limit the effects of forcing in producing independence results, has acquired the status of a definite line of research in Set theory.

In my presentation, I will take the side of the non-pluralist, and I aim to examine some aspects of the prospect for such a non-pluralist program in the contemporary debate. In particular, I will consider some issues connected with, what may be called, the Forcing Axioms program for the search of new axioms.

12.50-14.20 lunch

14.20-15.40 **Nathan Kellen.** Should Truth Pluralists be Logical Pluralists?

In this paper I examine two types of pluralism: pluralism about truth and pluralism about logic. It has been suggested by many contemporary truth pluralists that the best way to make sense of their view is to adopt logical pluralism. In this paper, I show how a truth pluralist can avoid a commitment to logical pluralism by adopting intuitionistic logic as the One True Logic. Further, I argue that not only can truth pluralists be logical monists, but in fact they should be monists.

15.50-17.10 **Andrea Strollo**. Alethic Pluralism and Mixed Inferences: a Lesson from Many-Valued Logic

Alethic pluralism is the philosophical position according to which there are many ways of being true. The view has been challenged to make sense of the traditional account of validity -understood as necessary truth preservation- when inferences involving propositions from different domains of discourse, thus possibly true in different ways, are considered. I will discuss the debate between some philosophers (i.e. J.C. Beall and C. Tappolet) under the light of an issue raised against the legitimacy of many-valued logic. I will then sketch a possible way out on behalf of alethic pluralism.

17.20-18.40 **Stewart Shapiro**. Conceptions of the Continuous

June 23rd

10.30-11.50 **Paul Simard Smith**. On the Jurisdiction of Logics: A Challenge for Domain-Specific Logical Pluralism

In this paper I raise a challenge for *domain-specific logical pluralism* (DLP). According DLP different logics govern deductive reasoning in distinct domains of discourse. In particular, in domains of discourse in which propositions are true because they possess the property of corresponding to an obtaining state of affairs advocates of DLP have argued that classical logic is correct. However, in domains of discourse in which truth is epistemically constrained and propositions are true in virtue of possessing the property of being superwarranted advocates of DLP have claimed that intuitionistic logic is correct (Lynch 2008, 2009; Pedersen 2014). The challenge for DLP that I raise emerges through a consideration of certain dialogues in which, I argue, an inference made during the dialogue is valid within the context of one participant in the dialogue but invalid within the context of a different participant in the dialogue. I argue that in spite of this shift in validity from one context to another the propositions under discussion in the dialogue are the same propositions in the different contexts. I conclude by proposing an alternative to DLP that better accounts for the sort of dialogues considered. On this alternative view logics govern contexts of inference rather than domains of discourse.

12.00-13.20 **Agustin Rayo**. Pluralism about Logical Space

I argue that there is no such thing as an objectively correct conception of logical space, and therefore that we ought to be pluralists about logical space.